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SUPREME
COURT WATCH
By Reginald C. Oh
uring the U.S. Supreme Court's 2003-04 Term, one of
the more controversial cases on its docket dealt with the
constitutionality of Pledge ofAllegiance recitations in
public schools. Specifically, the issue in Elk Grove Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004), was whether the in
clusion of the phrase "under God" in the Pledge of Alle
giance created a First Amendment Establishment Clause vi
olation. When the Court decided the case on June 14, 2004,
however, it strategically sidestepped the controversy entirely
by dismissing the case for lack of standing, deferring, to an
other day, a decision on the constitutionality of the Pledge of
Allegiance. This article will examine briefly the Court's
standing analysis, and then focus on the several concurring
opinions in which several members of the Court explained
how they would have ruled on the merits of the case.
The case began when respondent Michael Newdow, an
avowed atheist, filed a lawsuit in the federal district court chal
lenging the Elk Grove Unified School District's practice of
having school teachers lead their classes in daily recitations of
the Pledge ofAllegiance. The Pledge ofAllegiance states, "I
pledge allegiance to the Flag ofthe United States ofAmerica
and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under
God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." The current
version ofthe Pledge was adopted by Congress in a 1954 Act.
At the time the lawsuit was filed, Newdow's daughter was
a kindergarten student in the school district, and his con
tention was that the school district's policy of requiring his
daughter and other school children to recite the Pledge is a
form of religious indoctrination in violation of the First
Amendment. In his complaint, the father challenged both
the 1954 Congressional Act, and the school district's policy
of teacher-led Pledge recitations. The federal district court
rejected the father's contentions and dismissed the com
plaint. The Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals reversed, holding
that both the 1954 Act and the school district's policy vio
lated the Establishment Clause. Subsequently, the Ninth
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Circuit amended its first opinion, declined to determine the
constitutionality of the 1954 Act, and held only the school
district's policy ofrequiring recital ofthe Pledge to be an Es
tablishment Clause violation. The Supreme Court granted
writ ofcertiorari, and, by an 8-0 vote, reversed the Ninth Cir
cuit decision.
Five Justices voted to reverse the Ninth Circuit decision,
concluding that the respondent lacked standing to bring the
suit. Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Thomas concurred in
the judgment reversing the Ninth Circuit decision. All three
Justices disagreed, however, with the majority on the standing
issue. They held that the respondent did have standing to bring
the case, but voted to reverse the decision on the merits ofthe
case, concluding that the ·'under God" phrase does not violate
the Establishment Clause. Justice Scalia recused himself and
did not take part in the consideration ofthe case.
Justice Stevens wrote the majority decision, holding that
Newdow did not have standing as a noncustodial parent of
his daughter to challenge the school district's policy. Al
though the Court acknowledged that the father did have
standing under Article Ill's "case or controversy" require
ment, it concluded that the father lacked prudential stand
ing to bring the lawsuit. Under the doctrine of prudential
standing, the Court has established "self-imposed limits on
the exercise of federal jurisdiction." 124 S. Ct. at 2308.
Specifically, the Court held that the father did not have
standing to bring suit on behalf of his daughter, because he
did not have the legal right under California law to make de
cisions on her behalf That legal right belonged to the father's
ex-wife. Thus, the Court concluded that, since the father's
standing was derived entirely from his relationship with his
daughter, the fact that he did not have the requisite legal cus
tody over his daughter negated his ability to bring the lawsuit
on her behalf
The Court's refusal to decide on the merits ofthe case cre
ated a rather anti-climatic conclusion to the political and legal
controversy generated by the "Pledge" case. Perhaps the five
Justices who decided the case on standing are hoping that the
case will be dismissed and will not come before the Court in
the foreseeable future, thereby shielding the Court from un
wanted political controversy. The concurring opinions written
by Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Thomas, therefore,
provide the more interesting aspects of the decision, as they
showed the varying approaches the Justices will likely take
when and if this issue comes before the Court in the future.
Justice Rehnquist contends that requiring students to re
cite the Pledge does not violate the Establishment Clause be
cause "[r]eciting the Pledge, or listening to others recite it, is
a patriotic exercise, not a religious one. . . " 124 S. Ct. at
2320. As a patriotic exercise, the Pledge for Rehnquist is a
"declaration ofbeliefin allegiance and loyalty to the United
States flag and the Republic that it represents." Id at 2319.
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Essentially, Rehnquist contends that the inclusion of the
phrase "under God" does not transform the Pledge as a polit
ical oath into a religious invocation or prayer, and therefore,
recital of the Pledge "cannot possibly lead to the establish
ment ofreligion, or anything like it." Id at 2320.
Rehnquist's analysis is flawed because it relies on simplis
tic categorical reasoning to negate the religious/spiritual as
pects of the Pledge. He seems to suggest that because the
Pledge is about patriotism, it cannot be about religion, and
the Establishment Clause cannot therefore be implicated.
However, the patriotic nature of the Pledge, in conjunction
with its reference to God, arguably does strongly implicate
Establishment Clause concerns. Typically, the Establishment
Clause is thought of as creating a separation between
church/religion and state. The Framers were concerned
about the coercive potential in the intermingling of religion
and government.
The Pledge, however, instead of instilling a beliefin the
separation ofchurch and state, actually does the opposite and
inculcates in children the belief that patriotism and belief in
God are inextricably intertwined. For children required to re
cite the Pledge countless number of times throughout their
school going years, the Pledge may work to fuse in their
minds allegiance to the nation with allegiance to God. In
other words, the Pledge may teach children that pledging al
legiance to the United States is tantamount to pledging alle
giance and loyalty to God. In this way, it could be argued that
the Pledge raises establishment concerns precisely because it
invokes God as an integral part of an act ofpatriotism.
Justice O'Connor, in her separate concurrence, relies on the
doctrine ofreligious endorsement to contend that the Pledge
does not violate the Establishment Clause. Under the Estab
lishment Clause endorsement test, government sponsored
speech violates the Establishment Clause if it "makes a per
son's religious beliefs relevant to his or her standing in the po
litical community by conveying a message 'that religion or a
particular religious beliefis favored or preferred."' Id at 2321.
A government endorsed message violates the Establishment
Clause if a reasonable observer would conclude that the gov
ernment through its speech is sending a message to nonad
herents that they are outsiders in the political community.
For O'Connor, the question of whether the Pledge en
dorses religion comes down to the question ofwhether the
Pledge should be considered an act of"ceremonial deism."
Acts ofceremonial deism are facially religious references that
are employed primarily for secular purposes, and the Court
has held that such acts do not present any real establishment
of religion problems. Id. at 2323. Thus, for Justice O'Con
nor, the national motto "In God We Trust" is an act of cere
monial deism, because the motto commemorates the role of
religion in our national history, and does not invoke in a
meaningful way "divine provenance." Id at 2322.
Based on her analysis ofthe Pledge's history, its absence of
worship or prayer, its absence to any particular religion, and
its minimal religious content, Justice O'Connor concludes
that it is an act of ceremonial deism and therefore does not
convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief
State & Local Law News, Volume 28, Number 2, Winter 2005

is favored or disfavored. First, she emphasizes that in a fifty
year span, the Pledge has become a routine ceremonial act of
patriotism, in which "countless schoolchildren recite it daily."
Id at 2323. Moreover, for O'Connor, the fact that in the
fifty-year history of the Pledge, it has only been legally chal
lenged three times supports her conclusion that the Pledge
has become a routine, secular, and ceremonial act ofpatrio
tism that cannot be viewed as endorsing a particular religious
belie£ Id at 2324.
Second, she contends that a reasonable observer would not
view the Pledge as prayer or worship, nor would a reasonable
observer see the Pledge as a "serious invocation of God or as
an expression ofindividual submission to divine authority." Id
at 2325. Third, the reference to God in a general way suggests
that a reasonable observer would not conclude that the Pledge
in any way is favoring or disfavoring particular religious beliefs
or sects. Finally, she concludes that the Pledge has only a min
imal reference to God, and the brevity ofthe reference strong
ly suggests that it is a ceremonial exercise that does not con
vey a message ofreligious endorsement.
O'Connor's endorsement analysis is flawed because it el
evates formalism over realism. The critical flaw here is in her
use of the "reasonable observer" as the basis to determine
whether the Pledge conveys a religious message. Although
she does not explicitly mention the age of her hypothetical
reasonable observer, it seems fairly clear that the observer is
an adult and not a child. Specifically, given that this case is
concerned with whether or not the Pledge endorses religion
among schoolchildren, arguably, O'Connor's analysis of the
Pledge should have used the hypothetical reasonable school
child as the basis on which to determine the effect of the
message on its intended audience.
When a reasonable adult may view the Pledge as merely
a ceremonial reference to God, the critical question is how a
school child will understand the message put forth by the
Pledge. Given the impressionability of schoolchildren, espe
cially elementary schoolchildren, it would be much harder for
O'Connor to contend that a reasonable child observer would
view the Pledge's reference to God as minimal or as merely
commemorating the role ofreligion in our national history.
Moreover, the recitation of the Pledge in the school con
text is very different from other acts of ceremonial deism, in
which there are no elements ofrequired participation. No one
has to pledge allegiance to a Christmas creche, for example,
nor is one required to read and affirm the motto, "In God We
Trust," stamped on coins. In this case, however, children are
required to recite the Pledge and pledge allegiance to "one na
tion under God." Justice O'Connor tries to diminish the coer
cive nature ofthe recitation ofthe Pledge by noting that chil
dren may opt out and refuse to utter the part of the Pledge
that contains the "under God" phrase. But, in suggesting that
children have the option of"opting out" ofreciting the Pledge,
the forced recitation ofthe Pledge is creating exactly the situ
ation O'Connor suggests is an Establishment Clause viola
tion-it is treating those children who do not want to profess
allegiance to a nation under God as "outsiders in the political
continued on page 15
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community" on the basis of their religious beliefs.
Justice Thomas criticizes O'Connor and Rehnquist's
opinions for failing to recognize the coercive and religious
nature ofthe Pledge as it relates to schoolchildren. He con
tends that adherence to a prior Court decision holding that
a school prayer at a graduation ceremony violated the Estab
lishment Clause would require the Court to hold that recita
tion ofthe Pledge in schools similarly violates the Establish
ment Clause. Moreover, Thomas contends that the coercive
elements with the Pledge case are actually stronger than in
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), because "a prayer at a
graduation is a one-time event, the graduating students are
almost (if not already) adults, and their parents are usually
present. By contrast, very young students, removed from the
protection of their parents, are exposed to the Pledge each
and every day." Id. at 2328.
Moreover, Thomas contends that the Pledge clearly re
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quires students to declare a beliefin "one nation under God,"
and that declaration is tantamount to making children profess
a belief that "God exists," a religious act that the Court has de
clared unconstitutional in other cases. However, while Thomas
believes that the Pledge is unconstitutional under current Es
tablishment Clause doctrine, he would ultimately uphold the
constitutionality ofthe Pledge because he believes current Es
tablishment Clause doctrine should be overturned, and that
the Court should conclude that the Establishment Clause was
meant only to restrain the federal government in establishing
religion, and therefore, it should not apply to states.
Although the Court never reached a holding on the sub
stantive issue in the case, given that Newdow was dismissed
for lack of standing, nevertheless, the concurrences in New
dow gives us a glimpse into how the Court mav decide this
issue in the future.
.
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